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Information Diffusion in the U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust Market 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the information diffusion process in the U.S. Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) market with a focus on the impacts of changing market environments, 
information supply, and information demand on the lead-lag effect. The results suggest that 
a significant lead-lag relationship exists between the lagged returns of big REITs and the 
current returns of small REITs. This relationship has slightly decreased along with policy 
and environment changes that occurred in the U.S. REIT market during the study period 
from 1986 to 2012, while still remaining significant in the most recent REIT market. The 
process of information diffusion is becoming unstable in recent years and the reverse lead-
lag effect from small REITs to big REITs is observed especially when REIT market 
liquidity and return volatility are high. The lead-lag effect among REITs is driven largely 
by slow adjustment to negative information, which is magnified by a lack of information 
supply, especially as demand for such information increases. Finally, information flow 
from REITs with more media coverage to those with less media coverage becomes even 
more sluggish than the information flow from big REITs to small REITs. 
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Introduction 
 
The spread of new information is assumed to take place instantaneously among assets via 
rational market participants involved in complete and frictionless financial markets. 
However, Hong and Stein (1999) posit that this information actually diffuses gradually 
among investors, causing an observed predictability of return (i.e., lead-lag effect). A 
number of studies (Lo & MacKinlay, 1990; Brennan, Jagadeesh, & Swaminathan, 1993; 
Badrinath, Kale, & Noe, 1995; Hou, 2007; Cohen & Frazzini, 2008; Chordia & 
Swaminathan, 2010; Menzly & Ozbas, 2010; Shahrur, Becker, & Rosenfeld, 2010) not only 
provide evidence of a slow diffusion of value-relevant information but also suggest that the 
factors that cause this phenomenon include incomplete markets and limited stock market 
participation, asymmetric information, noise traders, limited investor attention, transaction 
costs, short-sale constraints, and legal restrictions. 
 Hou (2007) found that the lead-lag effect caused by slow information diffusion 
between big firms and small firms is predominantly an intra-industry phenomenon. In fact, 
examination of the lead-lag effect could be contaminated if companies under study tend to 
respond to different sets of information; thus, it is important to examine the lead-lag effect 
with companies that are expected to share a substantial amount of value-relevant 
information. Hou (2007) also suggested that the lead-lag effect is more pronounced in 
industries that are smaller, less competitive, and often neglected (e.g., industries to which 
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less analyst attention is directed), such as the REIT industry.1 Moreover, as REIT stocks are 
relatively homogeneous, they provide a well-controlled laboratory to examine the intra-
industry lead-lag effect caused by the slow diffusion of value-relevant information.  
The structural changes experienced by the REIT industry in the past two decades 
further suggests the need for a closer examination of time-series changes regarding the 
process of information diffusion in the REIT market. The tax legislation included in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (effective January 1, 1994) modified the “five 
or fewer” rule2 to allow each institutional beneficiary (e.g., a pension plan beneficiary 
rather than the pension fund itself) to be considered an individual REIT shareholder, thus 
encouraging more institutional investors, such as pension funds, to make large investments 
in the REIT industry. Another important structural change in the REIT industry after 1993 
was the increase in the number of REITs that specialized in distinct types of property (i.e., 
specialized REITs), a trend that may have affected the process of information diffusion in 
the REIT market. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
changed the accounting guideline for Funds from Operations (FFO), thus bringing 
increased transparency to the REIT industry (Higgins, Ott, & Van Ness, 2006). In addition, 
the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 allowed REITs to own taxable REIT 
subsidiaries and provide additional services to tenants and others while also reducing the 
                                                          
1  Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) reported that the average market capitalization of REIT stocks was 
$166 million in the 1980s and $616 million in the 1990s, while the average market capitalization of common 
stocks was $9.9 billion in the 1980s and $27.0 billion in the 1990s. Moreover, the average number of analysts 
following REITs was found to be 2.17 in the 1980s and 2.45 in the 1990s, while that average for common 
stocks was 21.76 in the 1980s and 22.86 in the 1990s. 
2  The “five or fewer” rule refers to the original 1960 REIT legislation, which stated that REIT income 
would be taxed if five or fewer individuals owned more than 50% of the REIT. This rule, which was intended 
to ensure diversified ownership, made it difficult for large investors, including institutions, to participate in 
REITs. 
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distribution requirement of REITs from 95% to 90%. This enactment of the RMA is 
expected to have a significant long-term impact on future growth, profitability, and risk in 
the REIT industry, as shown in Mori and Ziobrowski (2011). 
It is plausible to expect that information supply (e.g., media coverage) and 
information demand (e.g., Internet searches) affect the process of information diffusion, 
especially in a more neglected industry such as the REIT industry, because finance studies 
have suggested that media coverage (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, & 
Macskassy, 2008) and information demand (Veldkamp, 2006; Vlastakis & Markellos, 
2012) affect levels of informational friction and security pricing.    
This study examines (1) whether a significant lead-lag effect is evident among REIT 
stocks, (2) whether and how policy and environmental changes that have occurred over the 
last two decades in the REIT market have affected the ongoing process of information 
diffusion among REIT stocks over time, and (3) how information supply and information 
demand affect the process of information diffusion among REIT stocks. Implications from 
the finance literature on the topics of information diffusion, the unique characteristics of the 
REIT market, and the drastic policy and environmental changes that have occurred in the 
REIT market over the past two decades all clearly suggest the importance of precisely 
understanding the process of information diffusion in the REIT market. This study 
contributes to that gap in the existing literature by shedding new light on the information 
efficiency and transparency of the REIT market. Also, this study is the first to examine the 
time-series change of the information diffusion in the growth stage of the market and 
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possible impacts of information supply and information demand on the process of 
information diffusion.  
The results of this study suggest, first of all, that there is a significant lead-lag 
relationship between the lagged returns of big REITs and the current returns of small REITs, 
caused by the sluggish flow of information. This lead-lag relationship has slightly 
decreased along with policy and environment changes that are thought to have brought 
more informational efficiency to the U.S. REIT market. However, the lead-lag effect 
remains significant, suggesting that information continues to flow sluggishly from big 
REITs to small REITs, even at the level of informational efficiency apparent in the recent 
REIT market. It is found that market volatility, institutional investor participation, market 
liquidity, and size of REITs affect volatility of the lead-lag effect. When the REIT market 
liquidity and return volatility are high, the reverse lead-lag relationship from small REITs 
to big REITs is occasionally observed. The lead-lag effect among REITs is driven more by 
slow adjustment to negative information than by slow adjustment to positive information; 
this is most evident when the supply of information relevant to real estate and REIT 
markets is decreasing and the demand for such information is increasing. Finally, the 
information flow from REITs with more media coverage to REITs with less media 
coverage is even more sluggish than the flow from big REITs to small REITs. 
 
Literature Review  
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Perhaps the first study to offer empirical evidence of the lead-lag effect and its importance 
to stock-price dynamics in the general stock market was that of Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
who were able to show that stock returns are often positively cross-autocorrelated; 
specifically, the returns of large-capitalization stocks almost always lead to returns for 
smaller stocks. They also demonstrated that most of the lead-lag effect is actually not 
driven by market microstructure effects such as nonsynchronous trading or thin trading, 
thus implying that some stocks react faster than others to new information that offers value 
implications across a range of stocks.  
Following Lo and MacKinlay (1990), other studies on the lead-lag effect have 
further examined factors that potentially drive that slow diffusion. For example, Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) showed that returns on firms followed by many 
analysts tend to lead to returns on firms followed by fewer analysts, even when firms of the 
two types are of approximately the same size. Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) found that 
returns on the portfolio of stocks having the highest level of institutional ownership led to 
returns on stocks with lower levels of institutional ownership, even after controlling for 
firm size. Cohen and Frazzini (2009) found evidence of significantly predictable returns 
across customer-supplier firms and showed that the monthly strategy of buying firms 
whose customers had the most positive returns in the previous month and selling short 
those firms whose customers had the most negative returns yielded abnormal returns of 
1.55% per month. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) found that trading volume can be a 
significant determinant of the lead-lag patterns observed in actual stock returns. Similarly, 
Menzly and Ozbas (2010) found cross-predictability between economically related 
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suppliers and customers, which tends to be weaker for stocks with high levels of analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership. Shahrur, Becker, and Rosenfeld (2010) found 
international evidence of the customer-supplier/lead-lag effect; specifically, they found that 
equity returns of customer industries led the returns of supplier industries in 22 developed 
countries.  
Hou (2007) provided an extensive understanding of the nature of the process of 
information diffusion in the general stock market. Interestingly, Hou found that big firms 
lead small firms within the same industry, that this unique intra-industry lead-lag effect 
drives the overall lead-lag effect, and that the intra-industry effect is stronger in small, 
neglected, and concentrated industries. Hou also suggested that industry market share and 
analyst dispersion affect the lead-lag effect and that the intra-industry lead-lag effect is 
primarily driven by the sluggish response of firms to negative news regarding other firms.  
The REIT literature also has examined the process of information diffusion, with a 
focus on the linkage between REIT returns and private (unsecuritized) real estate returns 
and on the contemporaneous linkage between REIT stocks. While Tuluca, Myer, and Webb 
(2000) showed that the private real estate market seems to lead the REIT market 
informationally in the long term, most of the existing studies on the linkage between REIT 
returns and private real estate returns have found that lagged REIT returns are useful in 
predicting private real estate returns (Giliberto, 1990; Gyourko & Keim, 1992; Barkham & 
Geltner, 1995; Chiang, 2009). Chiang (2010) examined whether co-movement of equity 
REIT prices has changed from the vintage REIT era (1980-1991) to the new era (1992-
2004). These results show that REIT co-movement within the same property type indeed 
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increased during the new REIT era and suggest that this higher degree of co-movement is 
due mainly to increasing institutional participation in the new REIT era.  
Chung, Fund, Shilling, and Simmons-Mosley (2011) also examined REIT stock 
price synchronicity for the years 1997 through 2006. Their results indicate that 
synchronicity appears to be quite high, even in the relatively recent study period, especially 
among those REITs that are larger and more liquid. This finding may be due to the fact that 
larger REITs tend to be more homogenous and exhibit less firm-specific fundamental 
variation than smaller and less liquid REITs. They also found that synchronicity negatively 
relates to hedge fund ownership and is highest among industrial and regional mall REITs. 
Zhang and Deng (2010) suggested that contrarian profits can be partially explained by the 
lead-lag effects for hotel real estate stocks.  
Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) examined the time-series change of momentum 
effect in REITs during the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods to test the following two 
hypotheses: (1) if speed of information is affected by investor overconfidence, then a 
stronger momentum effect should be evident during the post-1990 period than during the 
pre-1990 period, and (2) if speed of information is determined by efficient information 
diffusion, then a stronger momentum effect should be found during the pre-1990 period. 
They found a stronger and more prevalent momentum effect in REITs for the post-1990 
period, thus supporting the overconfidence hypothesis that speed of information is more 
affected by investor overconfidence than informational efficiency. 
Recent finance literature has suggested the importance of both information supply 
(media coverage) and information demand (Internet searches) in understanding asset price 
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dynamics. Tetlock (2007) analyzed the content of newspaper articles and reported that 
pessimistic media contents predict downward price pressure and a subsequent reversal. 
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) showed that the proportion of negative 
words used in newspaper articles predicts earnings and stock returns. Veldkamp’s (2006) 
model suggests the importance of the interaction between information supply and 
information demand in the context of asset pricing, showing that the demand for 
information used to price the asset affects the attractiveness of the asset. Vlastakis and 
Markellos (2012) suggested that information demand, measured via Internet search volume 
from the Google Trends database, is significantly related to stock return volatility, trading 
volume, return, and risk. 
Financial contagion seems to affect the process of information diffusion from time 
to time. Although there still is a disagreement over a precise definition of financial 
contagion, contagion in equity markets refers to the notion that markets move more closely 
together during periods of crisis (Bekaert, Harvey, & Ng, 2005). Hasler (2012) defines 
contagion as a situation where return and volatility spread from one market over other 
fundamentally unrelated markets. Some of empirical studies found evidence that trade links 
help explain the pattern of contagion (Glick & Rose, 1999; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000). 
Other studies showed evidence to support the idea that U.S.-based mutual funds and 
commercial banks have played an important role in spreading shocks (Kaminsky, Lyons, & 
Schmukler, 2004; Caramazza, Ricci, & Salgado, 2000). Most recently, Hasler (2012) 
proposes that as a negative shocks hits one market, investors pay more attention so that 
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news transmits more rapidly to the estimation of the fundamental driving that market, 
suggesting the possible link between information diffusion and financial contagion.  
 
Data 
 
The sample of equity REITs is taken from CRSP data files. The study period runs from 
January 1987 to December 2012. The year 1987 was chosen as the start date for the 
analysis for two reasons. First, fewer than 100 equity REITs were listed before 1987, 
making empirical analysis practically infeasible before that date. Secondly, the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (effective January 1987) increased the popularity of REITs, thus allowing 
REITs to gain self-advised and/or self-managed status instead of externally advised status. 
This change in management status reduced some of the conflicts of interest that had existed 
between REITs and their shareholders. After 1987, the number of equity REITs ranged 
from 89 in 1987 to 217 in 1997. The full sample consists of 363 equity REITs that reported 
stock return data in the CRSP databases at some point during the study period. 
The analyses used in this study are based on weekly returns to mitigate confounding 
microstructure influences, such as bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading. To mitigate 
a confounding day-of-the-week effect, weekly returns were calculated by compounding 
daily returns between adjacent Wednesdays, as in Hou (2007), because high 
autocorrelations using Friday-to-Friday prices and low autocorrelations using Monday-to-
Monday prices were reported by Hou and Moskowitz (2005).  Other price related data such 
as market capitalization and bid-ask spread are also from CRSP. The data for institutional 
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holdings is from CDA/Spectrum Institutional Money Manager (13f) Common Stock 
Holdings, issued by the Thomson Financial Network. 
Two types of media coverage data are utilized: one for the overall REIT market and 
the other for individual REITs. First, information on the number of relevant articles that 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) was gathered from the ProQuest-ABI/INFORM 
database, using the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate Investment Trust(s),” and 
“REIT(s)” for each month from January 1986 to December 2012. This information serves 
as a proxy for the media coverage relevant to the overall U.S. REIT market. To examine 
impacts of media content on information diffusion, the total number of words in WSJ 
articles and the number of “positive” and “negative” words in WSJ articles in each month 
were also collected. The lists of positive words (353 words) and negative words (2,337 
words) were taken from Bill McDonald’s Word Lists Page 
(http://www.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html), which was created by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) to better reflect expressions used specifically in financial context. Figure 
1 summarizes the number of WSJ articles relevant to REITs and the proportions of positive 
and negative words to the total number of words in WSJ articles. As shown in Panel A of 
Appendix A, the average number of REIT-relevant WSJ article in each month for the 
overall period is 200.85, while the maximum number of article is 344 and the minimum 
number of article is 95. Panel A of Appendix A also shows that the average monthly 
number of negative word (3,364) is much larger than that of positive word (1,341). Second, 
information on the number of articles on each individual REIT was collected, using the full 
company name of each REIT for each year from 1986 to 2012. For each REIT, articles 
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appeared in all sources covered by ProQuest-ABI/INFORM were examined because the 
Wall Street Journal had too few articles on too many REITs. Figure 2 shows the number of 
such articles per REIT for each year, along with the number of equity REITs in the study 
sample. Panel B of Appendix A shows that, on average, there has been 14 articles about 
each REIT in each year, while, at maximum, there were over 800 articles on one REIT 
(Prologis) in the year of 2011.  
Demand for information relevant to REITs was measured by the number of Internet 
searches conducted within the U.S. with the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate 
Investment Trust(s),” or “REIT(s)” for each month from January 2004 to December 2012 
taken from Google Trends.3 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The methodology used by Hou (2007) was also used in the present study; REITs were 
sorted into three sizes of portfolios according to their end-of-June market capitalizations. 
Equal-weighted weekly returns were calculated for each portfolio from July of year t to 
June of year t+1 (i.e., portfolio constituents are updated annually at the end of June). The 
first- through fourth-order cross-autocorrelations between lagged returns on big firms and 
current returns on small firms, as well as the same cross-autocorrelations between lagged 
                                                          
3  Google Trends contains the Search Volume Index (SVI) of search keywords. The weekly SVI for a 
search keyword refers to the number of searches for that keyword, relative to the highest number of searches 
over time. Data are available beginning in the year 2004. Google search behavior is considered a good 
representative of Internet search behavior among the general population. For example, Google accounted for 
65.3% of all search queries performed in the U.S. during the month of September 2011. 
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returns on small firms and current returns on big firms, were calculated to reveal possible 
symmetric and asymmetric cross-autocorrelations.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the portfolios of the smallest 30% and the 
largest 30% of the REITs. The average return for small REITs (0.30%) was higher than that 
for big REITs (0.22%) for the overall period from July 1987 to June 2012 and for all three 
sub-periods. Small REITs exhibited more than double the return (0.24% per week) 
exhibited by big REITs (0.11% per week) for the earliest period, from July 1987 to June 
1994. This difference decreased after 1994; for the latest period, which ran from July 2001 
to June 2012, and the return was only slightly higher for small REITs (0.31% per week) 
than for big REITs (0.29% per week). It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of 
return for small REITs was smaller than that for big REITs in the two sub-periods 
following July 1994. The first-order autocorrelation decreases with size; ρ1(Small, Small) 
is bigger than ρ1(Big, Big) for the overall period and for the two sub-periods after July 
1994, while the first-order autocorrelation is much higher for big REITs (0.24) than for 
small REITs (0.01) during the earliest period, from July 1987 to June 1994. Table 1 also 
reports the first- through fourth-order cross-autocorrelations. Further, ρm(j, k), m = 0 to 4, 
refers to the mth order correlation coefficient between returns on the j size-ranked portfolio 
(j = Small or Big) and returns on the k size-ranked portfolio (k = Small or Big). The cross-
autocorrelations between lagged returns on big REITs and current returns on small REITs 
(ρm(Small, Big)) were almost always greater than those between lagged returns on small 
REITs and current returns on big REITs (ρm(Big, Small)), regardless of the number of lags 
14 
 
and the sample period. These results imply that significant lead-lag effects are caused by a 
sluggish information flow from big REITs to small REITs.  
 
The Lead-Lag Effect of Size Portfolios for the Overall Period 
 
Finding evidence of asymmetric cross-autocorrelations is not sufficient to strongly support 
the information-based hypothesis for the lead-lag effect, because these cross-
autocorrelation patterns could also be consistent with an alternative hypothesis based on 
time-varying expected returns (Conrad & Kaul, 1988; Boudoukh, Richardson, & Whitelaw, 
1994; Hameed, 1997). The time-varying expected returns hypothesis explains that cross-
autocorrelations between big firms and small firms (i.e., between lagged returns of big 
firms and the returns of small firms) are caused by a combination of high autocorrelations 
of small firms and a high contemporaneous correlation between big and small firms. This 
explanation suggests that the lead-lag effect will disappear once the lagged small-firm 
returns are controlled for effectively. To incorporate that control, the following vector 
autoregressions (VARs) were estimated:  
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In Equations (1) and (2), RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 
30% of the REITs. RBig(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% of the 
REITs. Equations (1) and (2) are estimated with one (K = 1) and four (K = 4) lags, 
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following Hou (2007). Estimations with higher lags were done as a robustness check, 
which resulting the finding that there were no significant effects with lags beyond four lags 
in any model. If the lead-lag effect (if any) is driven by a sluggish diffusion of information 
from big firms to small firms, then lagged returns on big firms should predict current 
returns on small firms, even after controlling for the lagged returns of small firms (i.e., 
Granger causality), as evidenced by the significant positive coefficient of b in Equation (1). 
Also, the sum of the coefficients of RBig (t-1 : t-k) in Equation (1) should be significantly 
different from zero and should be greater than the sum of the coefficients of RSmall (t-1 : t-k) 
in Equation (2); that is, 


K
k
k
K
k
k cb
11
.  
Table 2 summarizes the results of the VAR estimations. Table 2 shows that the sum 
of bk is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for both the four-lag (0.284, F = 
16.270) and one-lag (0.199, t = 6.300) regressions for the full study period. This 
statistically significant positive relationship between the lagged return on big REITs and 
current return on small REITs is economically significant as well. For example, a 1% 
decrease in the previous week’s return of big REITs leads to a 19.9 basis point decrease in 
the return of small REITs in the current week. Since the average standard deviation of the 
return on big REITs is 2.84% (see Table 1), a one standard deviation decrease in the return 
of big REITs leads to a decrease of more than 50 basis points in the weekly return of small 
REITs.  
The F-statistic for the test, 


K
k
k
K
k
k cb
11
, was also rejected at the 1% level and the 
5% level for the four-lag (F = 7.100) and one-lag regressions (F = 16.250), respectively. 
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These results strongly suggest the existence of a statistically and economically significant 
lead-lag effect between big firms and small firms among U.S. REITs.  
 
Time Series Change of Lead-Lag Effect of Size Portfolios 
 
To examine whether and how the policy and environmental changes that occurred over the 
last two decades in the REIT market affected the process of information diffusion over time 
among REIT stocks, the lead-lag effect is estimated for each quarter, following one-lag 
vector autoregressions based on the weekly return on the size of portfolios: 
,tetRb)(tRαα(t)R SmallBigSmallSmall )()1(1 110   (3) 
).()1(1 110 tetRd)(tRcc(t)R BigBigSmallBig   (4) 
Then, the time series of the lead-lag effect is measured by taking the difference between b1 
in Equation (3) and c1 in Equation (4), which measures size of the expected lead-lag effect 
from big REITs to small REITs, while controlling for the reverse lead-lag effect from small 
REITs to big REITs. The results are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 3 for three sub-
periods, defined by using July 1994 (considering the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993) and July 2001 (considering the change in the guidelines for FFO calculation in 
2000 and the REIT Modernization Act of 1999) as the two break points. Table 3 shows that 
the expected lead-lag relationship between big REITs and small REITs was strongest 
during the earliest period (July 1987 to June 1994). Before 1994, the U.S. REIT industry 
was dominated by individual investors, and it is natural to imagine that the level of 
informational efficiency was very low at that time. Also, the information supply for U.S. 
REITs was very limited, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, information must have been diffused 
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only slowly among REITs, resulting in a strongly significant lead-lag effect from big 
REITs to small REITs. During the second sub-period, from July 1994 to June 2001, the 
lead-lag effect declined by 47%. This result may indicate that information efficiency and 
transparency in the U.S. REIT market have increased over time, along with greater 
participation of institutional investors, an increased number of REITs, and increased media 
attention in the U.S. REIT market. However, Table 3 shows that the lead-lag relationship 
increased again for the period between July 2001 and June 2012. In fact, the ANOVA 
comparison of the mean of the lead-lag effect reveals no difference among three sub-
periods (F = 0.08, p = 0.926), thus suggesting that information still flows sluggishly from 
big REITs to small REITs, even at the level of informational efficiency seen in the recent 
REIT market.  
It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of the lead-lag effect is much 
larger (1.258) in the most recent period (between July 2001 and June 2012) than in earlier 
two sub-periods (0.777 and 0.768, respectively), as shown in Figure 3 and Table 3. In the 
most recent period, small REITs lead big REITs significantly in some quarters, while the 
expected lead-lag effect from big REITs to small REITs is also strongly evident in other 
quarters (Figure 3).  
 
Reasons Behind Time Series Change of Lead-Lag Effect 
 
To examine possible reasons behind this increased volatility of the lead-lag effect, Table 4 
compares the lead-lag effect along with REIT market condition variables between the 
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period after the second quarter of 2001 (Panel B) and the earlier period (Panel A). In fact, 
the two-group variance-comparison test finds that the variance of the lead-lag effect is 
significantly greater at the 1% level (F = 2.689) in the recent period than the earlier period, 
while there is no statistically significant difference in mean (t = 0.132). As shown in Panel 
B of Table 4, in the most recent period, the U.S. REIT market experienced increased 
market return volatility (Index_std), increased institutional investor share holdings 
(Inst_ratio), and decreased liquidity (bidask),4 suggesting that the growing turmoil in the 
recent REIT market may have complicated the process of information diffusion among 
REIT stocks. Also, the size of the REIT market (Mktcap) as well as the size of individual 
REITs (Small_size, Big_size) became significantly larger in the most recent period, 
implying that even relatively small REITs became big enough so that they attract investor 
attentions, occasionally leading bigger REITs.  
The reverse lead-lag effect from small REITs to big REITs, represented by negative 
values of Diff_lead-lag, is worth detailed investigation, since it has not been reported by 
prior studies and it occurs from time to time throughout the study period as shown in Figure 
3. A regression is run focusing only on quarters in which small REITs lead big REITs (i.e., 
a dependent variable, Diff_lea-lag, takes negative values). Table 5 shows the result of the 
regression. The result shows that small REITs tend to lead big REITs when the market 
volatility is higher, institutional investor participation is lower, and the market liquidity is 
higher. In addition, this reverse lead-lag effect is more evident when the size of REITs 
including small REITs is larger. The result suggests that the reverse lead-lag effect is 
                                                          
4  The bid-ask spread has widened especially during the credit crisis. 
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observed probably because some small REITs are big enough to attract investor attention 
(especially individual investors’ attention) when the liquidity and volatility are generally 
high. 
 
Impacts of Media Coverage and Media Content on the Lead-Lag Effect 
 
To examine possible impacts of media coverage and content on the observed lead-lag effect, 
the whole sample period was first divided into two sub-periods based on media coverage, 
defined using the monthly number of REIT-relevant articles that appeared in the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ) with the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate Investment Trust(s),” 
or “REIT(s).” All weeks within those months in which the number of articles increased 
from the previous month were defined as INCREASING media coverage weeks. Weeks of 
other months were defined as DECREASING media coverage weeks. The whole sample 
period was also divided into two sub-periods based on the media content, which was 
defined using the monthly proportion of positive (negative) words to the total words 
contained in REIT-relevant articles in the WSJ. All weeks within months in which the 
proportion of positive (negative) words increased from the previous month and the change 
in the proportion of positive (negative) was higher than the change in the proportion of 
negative (positive) words are defined as POSITIVE (NEGATIVE) news weeks. In Panel C, 
four sub-periods are defined based both on market media coverage (INCREASING or 
DECREASING) and media content (POSITIVE and NEGATIVE). For each sub-period, the 
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following one-lag vector autoregressions (VARs), based on the weekly return on the size of 
portfolios, are estimated for the overall study period from July 1987 to June 2012: 
,tetRb)(tRαα(t)R SmallBigSmallSmall )()1(1 110   (5) 
).()1(1 110 tetRd)(tRcc(t)R BigBigSmallBig   (6) 
Panel A of Table 6 first divides the whole sample period into two sub-periods based 
on the media coverage that is relevant to the overall REIT market. The relationship between 
the  lagged return of big REITs and the current return of small REITs is statistically 
significantly greater than the relationship between the lagged return of small REITs and the 
current return of big REITs at the 1% level, only when the REIT market-wide media 
coverage is decreasing (F = 23.30, Panel A-2). This result implies that when the REIT 
market-wide media coverage is decreasing, information diffuses quickly more toward big 
REITs than toward small REITs, resulting in a significant lead-lag effect between big 
REITs and small REITs. At the same time, the speed of information diffusion becomes 
more homogeneous among all REITs when the market-wide media coverage is increasing, 
as indicated by the symmetric lead-lag relationship between big REITs and small REITs 
(Panel A-1). Note also that a significant negative relationship exists between lagged small 
REITs and current big REITs in Panel A-2. This negative relationship is simply a result of 
the fact that the relative speed of adjustment is measured for two portfolios. Brennan, 
Jagadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) show that if returns on a small portfolio adjust more 
slowly to common information than returns on a big portfolio, then the slope coefficient for 
the lagged return on the small portfolio could be negative in regressions involving the big 
portfolio return as the dependent variable.  
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Panel B in Table 6 shows the results of VARs for two sub-samples as defined by the 
media content – a POSITIVE news sample (Panel B-1) and a NEGATIVE news sample 
(Panel B-2). The coefficient b1 is positive and significant at the 1% level in both cases 
(0.179, t = 3.15 for POSITIVE; 0.134, t = 2.710 for NEGATIVE). The test 11 cb   is also 
rejected in both cases (F = 5.800, significant at the 5% level for POSITIVE; F = 11.370, 
significant at the 1% level for NEGATIVE). The significance is greater with the 
NEGATIVE news sample in which the REIT-relevant WSJ articles contain an increasing 
number of negative words, suggesting that the lead-lag effect among REITs is driven more 
by a slow adjustment to negative information than a slow adjustment to positive 
information. This result is, to some extent, consistent with Diamond and Verracchia (1987) 
and Hou (2007), who argue that it takes longer for negative information than positive 
information to be fully incorporated into stock prices because investors cannot immediately 
short sell an overpriced security due to short-sale constraints and prohibitive shorting costs. 
In fact, short-sale constraints seem to be evident among REIT stocks, as Blau, Hill, and 
Wang (2011) showed that REITs are shorted less frequently than non-REITs and Chen, 
Downs, and Patterson (2012) showed that overvaluation of REITs is associated with greater 
short interest and less transparency. This slower price response to negative information may 
also be due to the fact that investors tend to become risk-seeking and hold losing stocks for 
too long (Odean, 1998).  
Panel C of Table 6 defines four sub-periods based on both market-wide media 
coverage (INCREASING or DECREASING) and media content (POSITIVE or 
NEGATIVE). The results for VARs show that the lead-lag relationship between big REITs 
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and small REITs is by far most significant when the market-wide media coverage is 
decreasing and the media reports more negative news (Panel C-4). The test 11 cb   is 
rejected at the 1% level (F = 19.21). Thus, among small REITs, REIT prices show slow 
adjustment especially to negative information; further, this asymmetric information flow is 
magnified when REIT market-wide media coverage is decreasing (i.e., information supply 
is lacking). 
 
Impacts of Media Coverage and Google Search on the Lead-Lag Effect 
 
The finance literature suggests the importance of interaction between information supply 
(e.g., media coverage) and information demand (e.g., Internet searches) in asset pricings. 
Table 7 first divides the whole sample period into two sub-periods based on the media 
coverage, as was done in Table 6 (Panel A). Note that the analysis period for Table 7 is 
limited to the period between January 2004 and December 2012 due to the availability of 
Google Trends data. In Panel B, the whole sample period is divided into two sub-periods 
based on the information demand, which is defined using the monthly number of Internet 
searches conducted within the U.S. with the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate 
Investment Trust(s),” or “REIT(s),” taken from the Google Trends database. All weeks 
within months in which the number of Google searches increased from the last month are 
defined as INCREASING Google search weeks. Weeks of other months are defined as 
DECREASING Google search weeks. 
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 Panel A of Table 7 confirms, with a different analysis period, the robustness of the 
result that the slow diffusion of information, resulting in a significant lead-lag effect 
between big REITs and small REITs, is evident when the REIT market-wide media 
coverage is decreasing, as reported in Panel A of Table 6. Interestingly, Panel B of Table 7 
shows the opposite impact of Google searches (information demand) on the information 
diffusion. As evident in the F1 that tests 11 cb  , the asymmetric lead-lag effect from big 
REITs to small REITs is significant at the 1% level only when demand for REIT-relevant 
information is increasing (Panel B-1). Panel C further reveals that the significant lead-lag 
effect is strongly evident when the media coverage is decreasing and Google searches are 
increasing. This result suggests that information diffuses sluggishly and selectively rather 
than symmetrically when investors demand relevant information that is lacking in markets. 
Even when information supply is decreasing, asymmetric information diffusion is not 
observed if investors do not demand such information.   
 
The Lead-Lag Effect Among Media Coverage-Ranked Portfolios 
 
Considering the general lack of media attention (i.e., information supply) in the REIT 
market compared to the general stock market, media coverage is expected to play an 
important role in the process of information diffusion, especially in the REIT market. Thus, 
to further examine the role of media coverage as a determinant of the lead-lag effect among 
REITs, REITs were first sorted into three size-ranked portfolios (bottom 30%, middle 40%, 
and top 30%) based on market capitalization at the end of June of each year t. Next, each 
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size portfolio was sorted into three portfolios based on the number of articles found in the 
ABI/INFORM database that contained the company name of each REIT (bottom 30%, 
middle 40%, and top 30%) during each year t-1. Finally, the REITs from the three size 
portfolios with the same media coverage ranking were placed into a single portfolio. This 
process generated three media coverage-ranked portfolios while controlling for size.  
Equal-weighted weekly returns were computed for each portfolio from July of year t to 
June of year t+1. Four-lag (k = 4) and one-lag (k = 1) vector auto-regressions (VARs) were 
estimated based on the weekly return on the media coverage portfolios for the overall study 
period from July 1987 to June 2012: 
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In Equations (7) and (8), RLess(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of REITs with 
the least media coverage at 30% (low coverage REITs), while RMore(t) is the week t return 
on the portfolio of REITs with the most 30% media coverage at 30% (high coverage 
REITs). 
Table 8 shows that the lead-lag effect is significant at the 5% level, as evidenced in 
the F-statistic (4.42) for the test, 


K
k
k
K
k
k cb
11
, with four-lag regressions, further 
suggesting that high-coverage REITs significantly lead low-coverage REITs when 
controlling for size. It is interesting to note here that this lead-lag effect for media coverage-
ranked portfolios is not evident when only one lag is included (see Table 8), while the lead-
lag effect with size-ranked portfolios is significant for both four-lag regressions and one-lag 
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regressions (see Table 2). These results suggest that information will flow even more 
sluggishly from REITs with more media coverage to REITs with less media coverage than 
from large REITs to small REITs. Figure 4 confirms this argument. Figure 4 also shows 
impulse responses where the impulse variable is returns on big REITs (high coverage 
REITs) and the response variable is returns on small REITs (low coverage REITs) in Panels 
A and B, respectively. Panel A suggests that information flows from big REITs to small 
REITs with a one-week or three-week lag. Panel B suggests that information flows from 
high coverage REITs to low coverage REITs with both two-week and three-week lags.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
Several additional analyses were conducted as robustness checks. First, analyses were done 
including all equity REITs, mortgage REITs, and hybrid REITs (total sample size = 476 
REITs). Second, equal-weighted size-ranked and media coverage-ranked portfolios were 
replaced with value-weighted portfolios. These different sample and portfolio formations 
did not change any major conclusions or interpretations of the study. 
In examining roles of information supply and information demand on the process of 
information diffusion, the keywords of “Real Estate,” “Real Estate Investment Trust(s),” or 
“REIT(s) were used. Information attached to the keyword of “Real Estate” may be too 
general and may not be relevant to REITs. The analyses were done excluding the keyword 
of “Real Estate” in counting the numbers of WSJ articles and google searches. These 
analyses did not change the conclusions.  
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Finally, Tables 6 and 7 show the results based on one-lag vector autoregressions. 
Since market conditions are defined using monthly data (e.g., monthly numbers of WSJ 
articles and google searches), it is possible to estimate four-lag vector autoregressions for 
these sub-samples. The robustness checks based on four-lag vector autoregressions show 
the same results in examining impacts of media coverage and media content on the lead-lag 
effect (Table 6). The four-lag based analysis that examines impacts of media coverage and 
Google search on the lead-lag Effect (Table 7) shows the same results except for one 
situation. In Panel C-4 of Table 7, there is no significant expected lead-lag effect from big 
REITs to small REITs when both media coverage and google search are decreasing based 
on the one-lag analysis as shown by small F-value (0.160). However, the four-lag analysis 
for the same situation shows that small REITs significantly lead big REITs when both 
media coverage and google search are decreasing.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Given the unique characteristics of the REIT market and the drastic policy and 
environmental changes that have occurred within it over the last two decades, this study 
examined (1) whether a significant lead-lag effect is evident among REIT stocks, (2) 
whether and how policy and environmental changes in the REIT market over the last two 
decades have affected the ongoing process of information diffusion among REIT stocks 
over time, and (3) how information supply and information demand affect the process of 
information diffusion among REIT stocks. The results first suggest that there is a significant 
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lead-lag relationship, driven by the sluggish flow of information, between the lagged 
returns of big REITs and the current returns of small REITs. This significant lead-lag 
relationship is evident even in the most recent period, from 2001 to 2012, while the process 
of information diffusion is becoming unstable, sometimes resulting in the reverse lead-lag 
relationship from small REITs to big REITs especially when the liquidity and volatility are 
high. The lead-lag effect among REITs was found to be driven more by a slow adjustment 
to negative information than by a slow adjustment to positive information, probably due to  
short-sale constraints (Diamond & Verracchia, 1987) and investors’ risk-seeking behavior 
in a  loss situation (Odean, 1998). This slow adjustment to negative information is most 
evident when the supply of information relevant to real estate and REIT markets is 
decreasing and the demand for such information is increasing. Finally, the information flow 
from REITs with more media coverage to REITs with less media coverage is even more 
sluggish than the flow from big REITs to small REITs. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for size portfolios 
 
Period
Size Portfolio Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big
N 51 49 36 37 67 64 51 47
Mean return 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
Std. dev. Return 0.024 0.028 0.022 0.016 0.012 0.018 0.030 0.038
Mean size 0.093 2.501 0.010 0.264 0.048 1.257 0.174 4.712
Median size 0.062 1.896 0.011 0.233 0.053 1.237 0.188 4.721
ρ0(j,Small) 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.80
ρ0(j,Big) 0.69 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.80 1.00
ρ1(j,Small) 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.06 -0.10
ρ1(j,Big) 0.16 -0.04 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.15 -0.08
ρ2(j,Small) 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.09 -0.07 0.07 0.03
ρ2(j,Big) 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.04
ρ3(j,Small) 0.12 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.06
ρ3(j,Big) 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.17 0.08
ρ4(j,Small) 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05
ρ4(j,Big) 0.01 -0.04 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.06
Overall period:
 1987.7 - 
2012.6
Subperiod 
1987.7 - 
1994.6
Subperiod:
1994.7 -
 2001.6
Subperiod: 
2001.7 -
 2012.6
A
ut
oc
or
re
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Table 1 reports summary statistics for size-sorted portfolios. The overall study period is 
from July 1987 to June 2012. Results are also shown for three sub-periods: July 1987 to 
June 1994, July 1994 to June 2001, and July 2001 to June 2012. I sort REITs into three size 
portfolios (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) based on their end-of-June market 
capitalization. I compute equal-weighted weekly returns for each portfolio from July of 
year t to June of year t + 1. Portfolio ‘Small’ refers to the portfolio of the smallest 30% 
REITs, and Portfolio ‘Big’ refers to the portfolio of the largest 30% REITs. N is the average 
number of REITs in each portfolio. Mean size and median size are reported in billions of 
dollars. ρm(j, k), m = 0 to 4, refers to the mth order correlation coefficient between returns 
on the j size-ranked portfolio (j = Small or Big) and returns on the k size-ranked portfolio (k 
= Small or Big). For example, ρ1(Small, Big) represents the correlation between week t 
return on the small size portfolio and week t − 1 return on the big size portfolio, and ρ1(Big, 
Small) represents the correlation between week t return on the big size portfolio and week t 
− 1 return on the small size portfolio. 
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Table 2: Lead-lag effect of size portfolios 
 
  Four-lag regressions   One-lag regressions 
LHS 
RSmall 
(t-1 : t-4)  
RBig 
(t-1 : t-4)  F1   
RSmall
 (t-1)  
RBig 
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall (t) 0.050 0.284 7.100*** -0.109 0.199 16.250*** 
0.440 16.270*** -2.890*** 6.300*** 
RBig (t) -0.097 0.103 -0.071 0.004
  1.100  1.430      -1.550  0.120     
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the following four-lag (K = 4) and one-lag (K = 1) vector autoregressions (VARs) based on 
weekly return on the size portfolios for the period between 1987.7 and 2012.6 (1,292 weeks): 
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In Equations (T2-1) and (T2-2), RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 30% REITs. RBig(t) is the week t 
return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% REITs. Rsmall (t-1 : t-k), k = 1 or 4 reports 

K
k
kα
1
from Equation (T2-1) or 
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from Equation (T2-2). Italics indicate the F-statistics (t-statistics) for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients 
equals zero in the four-lag (one-lag) regressions. F1 reports the F-statistic for the cross-equation hypothesis that RBig (t-1 : t-k) 
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. Finally, ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Time series change of lead-lag effect of size portfolios 
 
Diff_lead-lag Mean Std. Min Max Diff-test
1987.7 to 1994.6 (28 quarters) 0.215 0.777 -1.452 2.042 
1994.7 to 2001.6 (28 quarters) 0.115 0.768 -1.446 1.973 
2001.7 to 2012.6 (44 quarters) 0.194 1.258 -2.668 3.558 0.08
 
This table summarizes the time series change of the lead-lag effect estimated quarterly for 
the period from the third quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2012 as shown in Figure 3, 
following one-lag vector autoregressions (VARs) based on the weekly return on the size of 
portfolios: 
,tetRb)(tRαα(t)R SmallBigSmallSmall )()1(1 110   (T3-1) 
).()1(1 110 tetRd)(tRcc(t)R BigBigSmallBig   (T3-2) 
In Equations (F3-1) and (F3-2), RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 
30% REITs. RBig(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% REITs. The 
coefficient b1 represents the lead-lag from big portfolio to small portfolio and the 
coefficient c1 represents the lead-lag from small portfolio to big portfolio. The variable, 
Diff_lead_lag, is the difference between b1 and c1, which measures size of the expected 
lead-lag effect from big portfolio to small portfolio while controlling for the reverse lead-
lag effect. Statistics are summarized for three sub-periods: 1987.7 to 1994.6; 1994.7 to 
2001.6; and 2001.7 to 2012.6. The last column (Diff-test) shows the result (f-value) of 
ANOVA comparison of the mean of Diff_lead_lag among three sub-periods. 
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Table 4: Comparison of market condition between two sub-periods 
 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Diff_lead-lag 0.165 0.767 -1.452 2.042
Index_ret 0.026 0.070 -0.146 0.227
Index_std 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.037
Inst_ratio 0.290 0.085 0.173 0.417
Bidask 0.346 0.065 0.232 0.534
Nofreit 136 57 53 201
Mktcap 116,810       122,885       4,759           335,843       
Wsj 620 138 373 911
Small_ret 0.041 0.108 -0.184 0.423
Big_ret 0.022 0.074 -0.117 0.255
Small_size 28,908         24,287         7,574           78,924         
Big_size 759,534       664,666       220,200       1,969,051    
Diff_lead-lag 0.194 1.258 -2.668 3.558 0.132 2.689 ***
Index_ret 0.035 0.128 -0.388 0.333 0.425
Index_std 0.030 0.021 0.011 0.120 5.193 ***
Inst_ratio 0.553 0.090 0.352 0.656 14.885 ***
Bidask 0.690 0.360 0.311 2.104 6.250 ***
Nofreit 144 14 124 164 1.064
Mktcap 573,003       143,599       331,409       872,523       16.789 ***
Wsj 585 149 355 824 -1.227
Small_ret 0.042 0.121 -0.387 0.374 0.034
Big_ret 0.038 0.133 -0.394 0.390 0.709
Small_size 173,768       74,598         60,565         293,421       12.376 ***
Big_size 4,702,099    1,725,966    2,233,029    7,933,868    14.340 ***
Diff (B vs. A)
Mean Variance
Panel B: 2001.7 to 2012.6 (44 quarters)
Panel A: 1987.7 to 2001.6 (56 quarters)
 
 
This table compares statistics of the U.S. REIT market between the period from 1987.7 to 
2001.6 and the period from 2001.7 to 2012.6. Diff_lead-lag is the difference between b1 
and c1, which measures size of the expected lead-lag effect from big portfolio to small 
portfolio while controlling for the reverse lead-lag effect, as defined in Table 3. Index_ret 
is the total return of the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real estate index (REIT index), Index_std is 
the standard deviation of the REIT index, Inst_ratio is the average proportion of shares of 
REITs owned by institutional investors, Bidask is the average bid-ask spread of REITs, 
Nofreit is the number of equity REITs, Mktcap is the average market capitalization of 
REITs, Wsj is the number of REIT relevant articles appeared in the Wall Street Journal, 
Small_ret (Big_ret) is the total return on the portfolio of the smallest (biggest) 30% REITs, 
and Small_size (Big_size) is the average market capitalization of the portfolio of the 
smallest (biggest) 30% REITs. The last two columns (Diff (B vs.A)) show the t-statistics (f-
 
 
 
 
36
statistic) for the two-group mean-comparison (variance-comparison) tests, respectively. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Summary of regression for quarters when small REITs lead big REITs 
 
  Coef. t   
Index_ret 1.151 0.41   
Index_std -30.737 -1.86 * 
Inst_ratio 5.177 2.48 **
Bidask 2.266 2.21 **
Noofreit 0.001 0.19   
Mktcap 0.000 -2.71 **
Wsj 0.002 1.44   
Small_ret -1.436 -0.97   
Big_ret 0.107 0.04   
Small_size 0.000 -2.53 **
Big_size 0.000 2.43 **
_cons -3.057 -2.58 **
 
This table summarizes the result of the regression for the sub-sample of quarters in which 
small REITs lead big REITs (i.e., Diff_lead-lag takes negative values). A dependent 
variable is Diff_lead-lag that measures the difference between the expected lead-lag effect 
from big portfolio to small portfolio and the reverse lead-lag effect from small portfolio to 
big portfolio, as defined in Table 3. Index_ret is the total return of the FTSE NAREIT U.S. 
Real estate index (REIT index), Index_std is the standard deviation of the REIT index, 
Inst_ratio is the average proportion of shares of REITs owned by institutional investors, 
Bidask is the average bid-ask spread of REITs, Nofreit is the number of equity REITs, 
Mktcap is the average market capitalization of REITs, Wsj is the number of REIT relevant 
articles appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Small_ret (Big_ret) is the total return on the 
portfolio of the smallest (biggest) 30% REITs, and Small_size (Big_size) is the average 
market capitalization of the portfolio of the smallest (biggest) 30% REITs. The last column 
in Panel B (Diff (B-A)) shows the t-statistics for the two-group mean-comparison tests. **, 
and * denote significance at the 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
Table 6: Lead-lag effect of size portfolios, media coverage and media content 
 
Panel A: Media coverage 
Panel A-1: INCREASING media coverage (653 
weeks) Panel A-2: DECREASING media coverage (639 weeks)
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig 
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall (t) -0.041 0.183 0.150 RSmall (t) -0.161 0.212 23.300*** 
-0.790 4.480*** -2.930*** 4.360*** 
RBig (t) 0.147 -0.084 RBig (t) -0.247 0.089
  2.170** -1.580       -4.050*** 1.650*    
 
 
Panel B: Media content 
Panel B-1: POSITIVE news (439 weeks) Panel B-2: NEGATIVE news (485 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall (t) -0.116 0.179 5.800** RSmall (t) -0.080 0.134 11.370*** 
-1.700* 3.150*** -1.320 2.710*** 
RBig (t) -0.112 0.031 RBig (t) -0.229 0.020
  -1.360  0.460       -3.030*** 0.330    
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Panel C: Market coverage x media content 
Panel C-1:  INCREASING media coverage x  
POSITIVE news (233 weeks) 
Panel C-2:  INCREASING media coverage x  
NEGATIVE news (242 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig 
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall(t) -0.039 0.145 0.360 RSmall (t) 0.030 0.055 0.070
-0.420 1.890* 0.340 0.910
RBig (t) 0.046 -0.075 RBig (t) 0.097 -0.168
  0.400  -0.790       0.770  -1.920*    
 
Panel C-3:  DECREASING media coverage x  
POSITIVE news (206 weeks) 
Panel C-4:  DECREASING media coverage x  
NEGATIVE news (243 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall(t) -0.204 0.226 9.030*** RSmall(t) -0.167 0.215 19.210*** 
-2.080** 2.700*** -1.940* 2.740*** 
RBig (t) -0.297 0.168 RBig (t) -0.432 0.181
  -2.590*** 1.710*     -4.610*** 2.120**    
 
In Panel A, I divide the whole sample period into two sub-periods based on the media coverage, which is defined using the 
monthly number of articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) with the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate 
Investment Trust(s),” or “REIT(s).” All weeks within months in which the number of articles increased from the last month 
are defined as INCREASING media coverage weeks. Weeks of other months are defined as DECREASING media coverage 
weeks. In Panel B, I divide the whole sample period into two sub-periods based on the media content, which is defined using 
the monthly proportion of positive (negative) words to the total number of words contained in WSJ articles. All weeks within 
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months in which the proportion of positive (negative) words increased and the change in the proportion is higher than the 
change in the proportion of negative (positive) words are defined as POSITIVE (NEGATIVE) news weeks. In Panel C, four 
sub-periods are defined based both on market media coverage (INCREASING or DECREASING) and media content 
(POSITIVE and NEGATIVE). For each sub-period, I estimate the following one-lag vector autoregressions (VARs) based on 
the weekly return on the size of portfolios for the overall study period from July 1987 to June 2012: 
,tetRb)(tRαα(t)R SmallBigSmallSmall )()1(1 110   (T6-1) 
).()1(1 110 tetRd)(tRcc(t)R BigBigSmallBig   (T6-2) 
In Equations (T6-1) and (T6-2), RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 30% REITs. RBig(t) is the week t 
return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% REITs. Italics indicate the t-statistics. F1 reports the F-statistic for the test, 11 cb  . 
Finally, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Lead-lag effect of size portfolios, media coverage and Google search 
 
Panel A: Media coverage 
Panel A-1: INCREASING media coverage (222 weeks)   Panel A-2: DECREASING media coverage (219 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1) F1    LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1) F1  
RSmall (t) 0.070  0.111 0.760    RSmall (t) -0.389  0.377 13.330*** 
  0.690  1.460         -3.200*** 3.670***    
                  
RBig (t) 0.280  -0.205      RBig (t) -0.452  0.219    
  2.030** -1.980**        -3.160*** 1.810*    
 
Panel B: Google search 
Panel B-1: INCREASING Google search (199 weeks)
Panel B-2: DECREASING Google search (242 
weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)   
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall (t) -0.220 0.248 10.930*** RSmall (t) -0.154 0.241 0.090
-1.880* 2.550** -1.430 2.890*** 
RBig (t) -0.453 0.159 RBig (t) 0.179 -0.132
  -3.330 *** 1.410      1.250  -1.190     
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Panel C: Market coverage x Google search 
Panel C-1:  INCREASING media coverage x  
INCREASING Google search (96 weeks) 
Panel C-2:  INCREASING media coverage x  
DECREASING Google search (126 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall (t) 0.215 -0.079 1.760 RSmall (t) -0.033 0.216 0.040
1.340 -0.640 -0.250 2.250** 
RBig (t) 0.297 -0.381 RBig (t) 0.270 -0.127
  1.560  -2.600**      1.400  -0.900     
 
Panel C-3:  DECREASING media coverage x  
INCREASING Google search (103 weeks) 
Panel C-4:  DECREASING media coverage x  
DECREASING Google search (116 weeks) 
LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  LHS 
RSmall
(t-1)  
RBig
(t-1)  F1  
RSmall(t) -0.485 0.473 22.310*** RSmall (t) -0.287 0.279 0.160
-2.990*** 3.360*** -1.560 1.840* 
RBig (t) -0.900 0.525 RBig (t) 0.141 -0.192
  -5.050*** 3.400***      0.640  -1.060     
 
In this table, the sample period is from January 2004 to December 2012 due to the availability of Google Trends data. In 
Panel A, I divide the sample period into two sub-periods based on the media coverage, as in Panel A of Table 6. In Panel B, I 
divide the whole sample period into two sub-periods based on the information demand, which is defined using the monthly 
number of Google searches conducted within the U.S. with the keywords “Real Estate,” “Real Estate Investment Trust(s),” or 
“REIT(s),” taken from the Google Trends database. All weeks within months in which the number of Google searches 
increased from the last month are defined as INCREASING Google search weeks. Weeks of other months are defined as 
DECREASING Google search weeks. RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 30% REITs. RBig(t) is the 
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week t return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% REITs. Italics indicate the t-statistics. F1 reports the F-statistic for the test, 
11 cb  . Finally, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Lead-lag effect of media coverage portfolios 
 
  Four-lag regressions  One-lag regressions 
LHS 
RLess 
 (t-1 : t-4)   
RMore 
(t-1 : t-4)  F1    
RLess 
(t-1)  
RMore 
(t-1)  F1  
RLess (t) -0.205 0.319 4.420 ** 0.017 0.012 0.810
2.740 * 11.070 *** 0.280 0.270 
RMore (t) -0.201 0.252 0.118 -0.078 
  1.510   3.980 **     1.500  -1.320    
 
REITs are first sorted into three size-ranked portfolios (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) based on market 
capitalization at the end of June of each year t. Then each size portfolio is sorted into three portfolios based on the number of 
articles found in ABI/INFORM database that contains the name of each REIT (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) 
during each year t-1. Then REITs from the three size portfolios that have the same media coverage ranking are placed into a 
single portfolio. This process generates three media coverage-ranked portfolios while holding size approximately the same. 
Equal-weighted weekly returns were computed for each portfolio from July of year t to June of year t+1. The study estimates 
following four-lag and one-lag vector autoregressions (VARs) based on weekly return on the media coverage portfolios for 
the full study period from July 1987 to June 2012: 
,tektRbk)(tRαα(t)R
K
k
LessMorek
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k
LesskLess 
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In Equations (T8-1) and (T8-2), RLess(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of REITs with the least 30% media coverage. 
RMore(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of REITs with the most 30% media coverage. RLess (t-1 : t-k), k = 1 or 4, reports 


K
k
kα
1
from Equation (T8-1) or 

K
k
kc
1
from Equation (T8-2), depending on the left-hand side variable. RMore (t-1 : t-k), k =1 or 4, 
reports 

K
k
kb
1
from Equation (T8-1) or 

K
k
kd
1
from Equation (T8-2). Italics indicates the F-Statistics (t-statistics) for the 
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hypothesis, namely, that the sum of the coefficients equals zero for the four-lag (one-lag) regressions. F1 reports the F-statistic 
for the cross-equation hypothesis that RMore (t-1 : t-k) from Equation (T8-1) equals RLess (t-1 : t-k) from Equation (T8-2), 
testing 


K
k
k
K
k
k cb
11
. Finally, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: The number of REIT-relevant articles in the Wall Street Journal and the 
proportions of positive and negative words to total words in the articles 
 
 
 
This figure summrizes the REIT-relevant articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal 
(number of words in the WSJ articles (negative, right axis) in each month from 1987.01 to 
2012.12.WSJ) (# of articles, left axis), the proportion of positive words to the total number 
of words in the WSJ articles (positive, right axis), and the proportion of negative words to 
the total  
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Figure 2: The number of equity REIT and the average number of media articles per 
REIT 
 
 
 
This figure summrizes the number of equity REIT (# of REIT, left axis) in the study sample 
and the average number of articles per REIT found in ProQuest-ABI/INFORM database 
(Media per REIT, right axis) in each year from 1987 to 2012. 
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Figure 3: Time-Series Change in the Information Diffusion Process 
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This figure shows the time series change of the lead-lag effect estimated quarterly for the 
period from the third quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2012, following one-lag 
vector autoregressions (VARs) based on the weekly return on the size of portfolios: 
,tetRb)(tRαα(t)R SmallBigSmallSmall )()1(1 110   (F3-1) 
).()1(1 110 tetRd)(tRcc(t)R BigBigSmallBig   (F3-2) 
In Equations (F3-1) and (F3-2), RSmall(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the smallest 
30% REITs. RBig(t) is the week t return on the portfolio of the biggest 30% REITs. The 
coefficient b1 represents the lead-lag from big portfolio to small portfolio and the 
coefficient c1 represents the lead-lag from small portfolio to big portfolio. The bar chart in 
Figure 3 shows the difference between b1 and c1, which measures size of the expected lead-
lag effect from big portfolio to small portfolio while controlling for the reverse lead-lag 
effect. Horizontal lines divide the overall study period into three sub-periods: 1987.7 to 
1994.6; 1994.7 to 2001.6; and 2001.7 to 2012.6. 
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Figure 4: Impulse responses 
 
Panel A: Size portfolio, impulse = biggest 30% REITs, response = smallest 30% REITs 
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Panel B: Media coverage portfolio, impulse = most 30% covered REITs, response = least 
30% covered REITs  
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Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics for media coverage data 
 
Panel A: REIT-relevant Wall Street Journal articles 
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Number of articles 200.85 49.26 344.00 95.00
Total number of words 192,285.80 45,231.60 326,051.00 101,301.00
Number of positive words 1,341.07 389.91 2,601.00 43.00
Number of negative word 3,363.51 1,179.92 7,403.00 121.00
Ratio of positive words 0.0069 0.0008 0.0088 0.0003
Ratio of negative words 0.0173 0.0034 0.0265 0.0009  
 
Panel B: Articles on individual REITs 
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Number of articles per RE 14.03 41.70 837 0  
 
Panel A summrizes the REIT-relevant articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal in each 
month from 1987.01 to 2012.12. Panel B summarizes the number of articles per REIT 
found in ProQuest-ABI/INFORM database in each year from 1987 to 2012. 
